śrīpati, in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, criticizes the siddhāntas of Shankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva to establish his own school of thought based on Shaivāgama, Dvaitādvaita. He expresses severe disagreement with Shankara’s doctrine of māyā and the unreality of the world. According to him, if the world is to be assumed to be real only for the purpose of vyavahāra and not pāramārthika, then the doctrine cannot be accepted as true. He disagrees with such a truth that is confined to vyavahāra. He refuses to accept such a truth which is:
1. Only applicable to vyavahāra (gamyatvam)
2. Outside vyavahāra (bādhita)
3. True as well as untrue
4. The semblance of truth and yet not truth
He rejects that Shankara’s philosophy cannot be acceptable to persons seeking salvation and accuses smārtas of being sarvamatabhraṣṭas:
smārtān sarvamatabhraṣṭān jaganmithyātvasādhakān |
gaṇikācārasampannān pāṣaṇḍān parivarjayēt ||
He also attacks Rāmānuja, according to who, individual souls are not identical with the paramātman; they suffer from innate unbelief and not ignorance, while belief or love of Lord (bhakti), not knowledge, is the means of salvation or union with God. He disputes at length the Pāñcarātra criticism that the studying of Shiva Purāṇa and worshipping Shiva according to it, will result in sin because Shiva Purāṇa is tāmasic. This is, he says, an invention of the pracchanna Bauddhas (i.e. Advaitins or Nirviśēṣavādins) and is groundless. Since Vyāsa is the author of both Shiva and Viṣṇu Purāṇas, he questions whether the tāmasatva extends to both the Purāṇas or only to the former? If to former only, that position cannot be accepted as true. Then, again, does this tāmasatva extend to Vyāsa’s works alone or both to his works and himself? If it applies only to his works and not to himself, then such a position is not logical. If Vyāsa, as a sātvika, authored Viṣṇu Purāṇa, then it is not acceptable that he turned tāmasic to author Shiva Purāṇa. In the Veda, both Rudra and Agni who are treated to be synonymous, have been praised. This being so, even the Vedas which thus praise Shiva under these forms of Rudra and Agni should be termed tāmasic. This pracchanna Bauddha (it is unclear why Advaitins are accused of such prejudice against Shiva instead of the Vaiṣṇavas) invention cannot, therefore, be accepted. It is evident that during śrīpati’s time, completion between Hari and Hara cults had reached its zenith. The kind of arguments put forward by śrīpati against Viṣṇu and his votaries are indicative of intense feelings of rivalry. śrīpati quotes Haradattācārya who authored an entire work to establish the superiority of Shiva over Viṣṇu, Hariharatāratamyam. He was also the author of Chaturvēdatātparya samgraha which explains the essence of Vedas as being the adoration of Shiva as the Supreme God. śrīpati, along the lines of Haradatta, tries to argue that the upāsanā dēvatā of Gāyatrī is Shiva and not Viṣṇu. He seems to however forget that very same āgamas which he quotes as authority declare that Pañcākṣara is greater than Gāyatrī and can alone grant mōkṣa, thus contradicting his own set of pramāṇas.
The word pracchanna Bauddha was made popular by the at-times crass Mādhva author Nārayaṇa Paṇḍita. He talks of how Shankara adopted the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism to suit his own nirviśēṣa Advaita theory and remarks that the variation has become known as the pracchanna Bauddha theory:
asatpadēsansadasadviviktaṁ māyākhyayā saṁvr̥timabhyadatta |
brahmāpyakhaṇḍaṁ bata śunyasiddhyai pracchannabauddhō’yamataḥ prasiddhaḥ ||
It is beyond our understanding as to why śrīpati criticizes the Advaitins in the context of refuting Pāñcarātra. The ātman is anxious to unite with the blissful Brahman, and this, according to śrīpati, is the central subject of Viśiṣṭādvaita. He rejects this concept as being avaidika and reasons that being both simultaneously Viśiṣṭa and Advaita amounts to yukti-virōdha (opposed to reasoning). He applies the daṇḍa-puruṣa sambandha nyāya to prove this point. The man who carries a stick in his hand is called by the combined name of Dandi though he and the daṇḍa he carries are two different objects. Because he is related to the stick as its carrier, he is to be called by this single conjoint name of Dandi, affixing the viśiṣṭa pratyaya; both are correlated; not separate. An ordinary man who carries no daṇḍa calls the man who carries one, a Dandi. These two are two different persons and hence Advaita is not proved here. The point is thus pressed home that Viśiṣṭādvaita is against all reason. The ordinary man without a daṇḍa, the man with daṇḍa, and the daṇḍa itself are three different objects, and there being no union of the daṇḍa and the body of the man who carries it, there is no union between them, they are as different as the pillar and man. Thus, Viśiṣṭādvaita fails to fully explain the viśēṣaṇa and viśēṣya; nor does it show how they can be compromised.
śrīpati also refutes Madhva’s dvaita. It must be remembered however that his own Shaiva theory is bhēdābhēda, i.e. both bheda and abheda. But he does not agree with the bheda doctrine of Madhva, however, admitting that there is a temporary or transient difference between jīva and īśvara. The transient difference is, in his view, restricted to the time required for the jīva working out his emancipation after which he becomes īśvara. He refutes the Madhva view that the Creator of the world has bodily lineaments. He sees this as implying that the Creator also has rāga, dvēṣa, duḥkha, etc. which is not in accordance with the śruti. If Brahman had a bodily form, he would be liable to destruction. He concludes that the Vaiṣṇava and dvaita schools hold views that lead to confusion – rather they confuse themselves.