– Vesna A. Wallace
The Kalacakratantra summarizes its fundamental philosophical views in this single verse:
Identitylessness, the maturation of karma, the three realms, the six states of existence, the origination due to the twelve-limbed dependence, the Four Truths, the eighteen unique qualities of the Buddha, the five psycho-physical aggregates, the three bodies and the Sahajakaya, and animate emptiness. The [system] in which these [tenets] are taught is the clear and definite instruction of the Vajri.
Positioning itself in the above-mentioned philosophical views, it criticizes all other philosophical systems, including the Buddhist schools other than Madhyamaka. Although the Kalacakra tradition’s refutation of the non-Buddhist philosophical systems is based on the standard Madhyamika arguments, at times it uses some new and interesting examples in its logical analysis of other systems. It regards its critique of certain tenets of other philosophical systems as a means of leading individuals of different mental dispositions to some understanding of emptiness, which would be the foundation of their attainment of mundane siddhis. The following brief summary of the Kalacakra tradition’s rebuttal of the dogmas that in one way or another contradict the view of the absence of inherent existence best demonstrates the degree to which the Kalacakra tradition follows the Madhyamika mode of investigation.
The Kalacakratantra critiques Vaishnavism for its view of the Veda as being self-existent, eternal, and similar to space. It refutes the notion of the Veda as self-existent and eternal on the basis that the word “Veda” signifies a referent that is produced by the activity of the throat, palate, and the like. It further argues that the Veda is also not identical with the referent, since a word and its referent cannot be identical. If there were such an identity, then when one utters the word “fire” it would burn one’s mouth. Likewise, it repudiates the notion that the Veda is similar to space on the grounds that it is local in usage and recited by the mouth. It also objects to the notion that the Veda is a standard for learned and knowledgeable men, since low castes such as Sudras read and write.
Furthermore, the Kalacakratantra critiques the Saiva notion of Isvara as the creator. The Kalacakratantra argues that if one asserts Isvara as the creator, one implies that Isvara is one who experiences karma since it is never the case that one person eats a salty cake and another person experiences the result and dies from thirst. An agent is never established without karma. And if he is not an agent of karma, as Saivas claim, then it implies that he is dependent on another agent, who is his instigator. This, it says, contradicts the very term “Isvara” which implies independence. Thus, according to the Kalacakratantra, Isvara has never been the creator who bestows the results of virtue and sin, disregarding the karma of living beings. Likewise, if the creator is devoid of the atoms of the elements, then in the absence of matter, he does not create anything; and if he is devoid of the sense-objects, as Saivas say, then that creator has neither perceptual nor inferential means of valid knowledge.
In light of its view of dependent origination, the Kalacakratantra asserts that the efficacy of phenomena is not caused by anyone in the triple world but that the origination of all phenomena takes place due to the conjunction of things. Thus, due to the conjunction of moonstone with moon rays, water appears from the moonstone, and due to the conjunction of an iron stick with a lodestone, the iron stick is set in motion, and so on. By means of these and other examples, it tries to demonstrate that things never occur by the will of the creator.
From the vantage point of identitylessness, the Kalacakratantra critiques the notion of the Self (atman) as being omnipresent and permanent. It argues that the Self cannot be omnipresent, since it experiences suffering due to separation from relatives. If it were omnipresent, it would exist as one and would not suffer due to being separated from loved ones. Likewise, if the Self were omnipresent, then one sentient being would experience the suffering of all sentient beings. Moreover, it argues that one cannot say that there are many Selves, because that would imply that there is no omnipresence of many Selves. It refutes the notion of the permanent Self, pointing to its susceptibility to change, as in the case of falling in love.
In light of its refutation of the Self, the Kalacakratantra asserts that there is no one who departs to liberation—there is only a collection of phenomena in cessation—and yet there is a departure to liberation. Likewise, there is bondage for originated phenomena, but there is no one who is bound. The state of the Buddha is identical with existence and nonexistence, and it is without inherent existence, devoid of conceptualizations and matter, and free of momentariness. Therefore, the teachings of the Buddha, which are free of the demons of conceptualizations, cannot be destroyed by the words of gods and nagas, which are accompanied by demons, just like a wrestler who is free of demons cannot be killed by a wrestler who is possessed by demons.
The Kalacakratantra refutes the teachings of Rahman, or the Dharma of Tajikas, on the basis of their assertion that in this life the individual experiences the result of actions that he performed earlier in this lifetime, and that a person who dies experiences pleasure or suffering in heaven or hell through another human form. It argues that if it is as the Tajikas teach, then one could not annihilate one’s own karma from one birth to another, and consequently, one could not escape transmigratory existence or enter liberation even in the course of an immeasurable number of lives.
It critiques the doctrine of the Materialists (Carvaka), which denies the existence of god and the maturation of karma and claims that one experiences only the amassment of atoms, arguing that this Materialist doctrine destroys the path of liberation for people. The Kalacakratantra argues that if just like the power of an intoxicating drink, the witnessing mind arises due to configurations of the elements, then trees would also have consciousness due to the agglomeration of the elements. But if inanimate things lack the efficacy of living beings, then the agglomeration of the elements is inadequate for producing consciousness.
The Kalacakra tradition also repudiates the Jaina doctrine, specifically, the Jaina assertion of a permanent soul (jiva) that has the size of the body, and the Jaina view of the permanence of atoms. The Kalacakratantra argues that if the soul would have the size of the body, it would perish after the removal of the arms and legs. Likewise, it argues that atoms are not permanent, since they are liable to change, as are gross and subtle bodies.
The Vimalaprabha critiques the Jaina argument that the substance of the soul is permanent, as gold is permanent, whereas its modes are impermanent, just as the modes of gold such as earrings are impermanent. The Vimalaprabha rejects this argument as invalid, on the basis that if the substance and its mode were identical, then there would be no difference between the two; and if they were different, there could be no mode without the substance; nor can one say that they are both identical and different, because of their mutual exclusion. Likewise, it refutes the Jaina notion that the three worlds are permanent on the basis that whatever is made of atoms never remains permanent. It also critiques the Jaina view that one soul acquires one body, such that plants and grains are also living beings. It argues against this view, stating that if a single soul is in a single body, then when one breaks the stem of a sugar cane into pieces, there would not be many pieces. But since there are many pieces, then the soul must have entered one of those pieces due to its karma. That does not stand up to logical analysis, because a sprout arises from each of the pieces of sugar cane that are replanted in the earth.
The Kalacakra tradition also critiques the Vaibhasikas, Sautrantikas, and Yogacarins as simple-minded Buddhist tirthikas who, grasping onto their own dogmatic positions (paksa), grasp onto the dogmatic positions of others and see the similarity or the contrariety with this or that dogmatic position of others. The Kalacakratantra refutes the Vaibhasikas’ assertion of the reality of the person (pudgala) endowed with a body at birth as the implication of the inherent existence of the pudgala. It argues that the pudgala cannot be one’s inherent nature, because if the pudgala were of the nature of cognition, then it would be impermanent, for the nature of cognition is impermanent; and if the pudgala were of the nature of non-cognition, then it would be unaware of its happiness and suffering.
The Kalacakratantra refutes Yogacara’s assertion of the inherent reality of consciousness and its classification of consciousness. In light of this rejection, the Vimalaprabha asks the following: If there is no form of an external object other than consciousness, then why does the external form of visual consciousness as the apprehender manifest itself as being of the nature of the apprehended? It cannot be due to the power of the habitual propensities of spiritual ignorance, as the Yogacarins say, because spiritual ignorance has the characteristic of the three realms, and the three realms are mere consciousness. Thus, mere consciousness is of the nature of spiritual ignorance, therefore, spiritual ignorance is not the disappearance of consciousness; but if the three realms are not mere consciousness, then the Yogacarins position has failed. The Vimalaprabha also refutes the Yogacara’s assertion that self-knowing awareness arises and ceases in an instant, resorting to the standard Madhyamika argument that the origination, cessation, and duration of phenomena do not occur simultaneously, for if they were to exist in a single moment, then due to the fact that time is a moment, birth, old age, and death would be identical. Moreover, if consciousness were to arise from a consciousness that has ceased, then it would be like the origination of a flame from a flame that has ceased, and this makes no sense. But if another consciousness were to arise from a consciousness that has not ceased, then it would be like the origination of a flame from a flame that has not ceased, which means that from origination to origination there would be a series of consciousness, like a series of flames. In this case, one cannot say that after the cessation of an earlier consciousness there is an origination of another consciousness, nor can one say that there is an origination of another consciousness from the earlier unceased consciousness, nor from the combination of the aforementioned two manners of origination, because of their mutual contradiction.
However, the Kalacakratantra indicates that the Madhyamika’s negation of the inherent existence of consciousness, which inspired some to say that the Buddha’s wisdom is not located anywhere, is a danger for those who, devoid of the self-aware gnosis of imperishable bliss, will grasp onto that emptiness and will thus fall into the trap of a doctrinal view and attain nothing.