– Sengaku Mayeda
It is well-known that Shankara is criticized by his opponents as a “Buddhist in disguise” (pracchannabauddha) and his philosophy as Māyāvāda which is but crypto-Buddhism.
Among the Vēdāntins, Bhāskara (750-800) is probably one of the earliest critics against Shankara. He called the Māyāvādin as “one who depends on the doctrine of the Buddhist” (bauddhamatāvalambin), and says that this position has been negated by the author of Brahmasūtra. Afterward, Yāmuna (918-1038), Rāmānuja (1017-1037), Madhva (1197-1276), Vallabha (1473-1531) and other Vēdāntins severely criticized Advaita Vēdānta, pointing out that it is, in essence, nothing but a Buddhist doctrine.
Then, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, Vijñānabhikṣu of the sāmkhya school shows in his Sāmkhyapravacana bhāṣya that the Māyāvāda of the Vēdāntins is of the same standpoint as that of the Vijñānavādin’s and criticizes the Vēdānta school as a whole. In justifying his criticism, he quotes a verse from the Padma Purāṇa which states that the Māyāvāda is an incorrect theory and is Buddhist doctrine.
māyāvādamasacchāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddhamēva ca |
māyaiva kathitaṁ dēvi kalau brāhmaṇarūpiṇē ||
Vijnānabhikṣu quotes this verse twice in his Sāmkhyapravacana bhāṣya.
This is true of modern scholars. For example, in his A History of Indian Philosophy, S Dasgupta remarks:
“Shankara and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the śūnya of specifically Nāgārjuna. I am led to think that Shankara’s philosophy is largely a compound of Vijnānavāda and śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upaniṣad notion of the permanence of self superadded”.
Thus, he supports Vijñānabhikṣu’s criticism against Māyāvāda.
Even S Radhakrishnan who asserts that “there is no doubt that Shankara develops his whole system from the Upaniṣads and the Vēdānta sūtra without reference to Buddhism”, says the following:
“We need not say that the Advaita Vēdānta philosophy has been very much influenced by the Mādhyamika doctrine. The nirguṇa Brahman of Shankara and Nāgārjuna’s śūnya have much in common”.
Shankara, however, vehemently attacks Buddhism here and there in his Brahmasūtra bhāṣya, Bṟadāraṇyaka bhāṣya, Upadēśasāhasrī, and his other works. What is Buddhism for him and his philosophy?
Around the fifth century when Vasubandhu (400-480) was active, there were four major schools in Indian Buddhism; they were the Sarvāstivādin, the Sautrāntika, the Mādhyamika, and the Yōgācāra or Vijñānavādin. It was also the common practice in the Indian philosophical schools, in general, to distinguish four Buddhist schools when they treated Buddhism. Shankara however, in his Brahmasūtra bhāṣya (II, 2, 18), criticizes the following three different types of Buddhist propounders:
Sarvāstitvavādin or one who asserts the real existence of everything.
Vijñānāstitvavādin or one who asserts the real existence of consciousness.
Sarvaśūnyatvavādin or one who asserts the emptiness of everything.
He keeps silent about any other Buddhist propounders but if we are to judge from Vācaspatimiśra’s commentary Bhāmatī on the Brahmasūtra bhāṣya, we can infer that the first propounder points not only to the Sarvāstivādin but also include the Sautrāntika. The second and the third propounders clearly refer to the Vijñānavādin and the Mādhyamika respectively. Therefore, it may be possible for us to see Shankara’s classification corresponding to that made in the general Indian philosophical treatises except for the order of classification.
It is indeed certain that Shankara is well aware of the terms Mādhyamika and Vijñānavādin since he uses these terms in his own works when he surveys Buddhist positions. Nevertheless, why does he use in the above instance of his Brahmasūtra bhāṣya the terms Sarvāstitvavādin, Vijñānāstitvavādin, and Sarvaśūnyatvavādin, other instances of which cannot be found elsewhere? He gives no explanation of these terms at all. Why does he not use such names as Mādhyamika and Vijñānavādin?
It seems that the context where Shankara criticizes other schools including the above Buddhists gives us a clue to solve this problem. Before Shankara begins to criticize the three kinds of Buddhist schools, he takes up the Vaiśēṣika school for his sharp criticism and characterizes it as ardhavaināśika or semi-nihilism. In this connection, he classifies Buddhism as sarvavaināśikarāddhānta or the doctrine which asserts the nihilism of everything, and it is after this that he undertakes the above classification of the Buddhist schools. In other words, in his understanding, the philosophical school which bears the name of Vaiśēṣika is characterized as semi-nihilism, and similarly, in the case of Buddhism, he presents his understanding of Buddhism in general as that doctrine which asserts the nihilism of everything.
From the above observation, we can safely infer that in treating the three types of Buddhist schools, Shankara intended to express the specific character of the particular Buddhist school in a word succinctly as in the case of the vaisheShika school and that for this reason, he did not use the usual names of the schools like Mādhyamika. In short, Shankara is not simply enumerating the names of the Buddhist schools but is making an attempt at critical classification of the doctrines from his own philosophical standpoint.
It is to be noted here that the description of the characteristics of the three Buddhist schools, terms astitva and śūnyatva which have to do with reality or ontological judgment are employed. Shankara makes his classification based on the criterion of what is asserted as real, or in other words, from his ontological point of view. He applies this criterion to each Buddhist school and in his attempt to present coherent expressions, his use of the terms Sarvāstitvavādin, Vijñānāstitvavādin, and Sarvaśūnyatvavādin are indeed appropriate.
If the same criterion is to be applied to Buddhism as a whole, Buddhism would come down to sarvavaināśikarāddhānta or that doctrine which asserts the nihilism of everything. This is because, not to mention Sarvaśūnyatvavādin, the Vijñānavādin, as well as the Sarvāstitvavādin, asserts the theory of kṣaṇabhaṅga or that of entities having but momentary existence and therefore, in Shankara’s understanding, Buddhism as a whole is a doctrine which asserts total nihilism.
Also, in explaining why there is a plurality of Buddhist positions, Shankara points out the difference in disciples’ innate ability of understanding (pratipattibhēda) and says as follows:
“The doctrine of the reality of the external world (Bāhyārthavāda) was indeed propounded by the Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things, but it does not represent his own true view (saugatābhiprāya) according to which consciousness alone is real (vijñānaikaskandha)”.
For Shankara, even that Buddhist theory that asserts that consciousness alone is real is nihilistic without a morsel of rationality. Shankara adds that it is not possible to lead one’s ordinary life on the basis of such a nihilistic view.
And finally, he concludes his criticism against the Buddha and Buddhism with the following words:
“No further special discussion is in fact required. Form whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walks of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a practical guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of consciousness alone, and total nihilism, has himself made it clear that he was a man given to making incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. Buddha’s doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness”.
As I have already mentioned, there appeared many critics against Shankara and his followers. It is very probable that those critics appeared not only after his death but also during his lifetime. In fact, Shankara himself explicitly admits in his Māṇḍūkyōpaniṣad Kārikā-bhāṣya that Buddhism is said to be in close similarity to the Advaita of his Paramaguru Gauḍapāda:
“This knowledge regarding the Ultimate Reality, non-dual and characterized by the absence of the difference of knowledge, object of knowledge and knower, is not the same as that declared by the Buddha. The view of the Buddha which rejects the existence of external objects and asserts the existence of consciousness alone is said to be similar to or very near the truth of non-dual ātman. But this knowledge of the non-dual which is the Ultimate Reality can be attained through Vēdānta alone”.
Here in this passage, Shankara recognizes the Buddhists’ denial of the real existence of the external objects and their acceptance of the real existence of consciousness only as of the points of similarity of Buddhism, which is the doctrine of the Vijnānavādin in this case, to the truth of non-dual ātman of Vēdānta.
On the other hand, critics against Buddhism like Vijñānabhikṣu also criticize as the point of similarity between Advaita and Buddhism that assertion of both schools regarding the non-real existence of the external objects or of the non-reality of the phenomenal world. This view, also called Māyāvāda, is that very point with regard to which Shankara also admits that the Advaita Vēdānta is criticized as similar to Buddhism. This is an important problem which touches on the very basis of the two schools.
It is indeed true as described above that, if both the Advaitins and the Buddhists equally assert the non-reality of the phenomenal world, then nobody can deny that the severe criticism that Advaita is the same as or similar to to the Buddhist doctrine is well-founded. However, Shankara and his followers have rejected their opponents’ criticism, emphasizing their own originality.
In the case of Shankara, as is seen in the above-quoted passage from his Māṇḍūkyōpaniṣat Kārikā-bhāṣya, he finds the Advaitins’ originality in the following two points: firstly the Advaita philosophy expounds the non-dual, Ultimate Reality which, unlike the Vijñānavādin’s vijñāna consisting of three components i.e., knowledge, object of knowledge and knower, does not possess any components like those, and secondly the Advaita philosophy is based on the absolute authority of the Upaniṣads. It is on the same points that Sarvajñātman sees the difference between the Vēdāntins and the Vijñānavādins in his Samkṣēpaśārīraka (II, 27-38).
When Shankara and his followers attack the Vijñānavādins, ultimately the above two points, especially the point that the Vijñānavādins do not recognize an eternal, unchangeable ātman, are the target of criticism. Likewise in the case of Shankara’s negation of the Mādhyamika philosophy, he shows the difference between the Mādhyamikas and his own position in the fact that the Mādhyamikas do not accept the basis of a reality which is the ātman of the fourth stage and, for this reason, criticizes the doctrine of śūnyatā or emptiness.
Also, Padmapāda (720-770), one of Shankara’s disciples, alludes to the doctrine of śūnyatā in the expression “niradhiṣṭhānādhyāsavādipakṣa” or the standpoint of the propounder who asserts that the superimposition (adhyāsa) has no foundation, and criticizes this point of the doctrine of śūnyatā.
In this way, the attacks against the Mādhyamikas are based on the point that it does not accept an eternal unchangeable reality that lies in the background as the foundation of the phenomenal world. Even those Hīnayana schools which recognize the reality of objects of the external world do not differ from the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins at all according to Shankara since they do not recognize a permanent substratum as far as they hold the theory of entities having but momentary existence. As such, all Buddhist doctrines are nothing but nihilistic doctrines (vaināśika) “not to be taken into serious consideration by those who are seeking ultimate bliss”.
In this connection, the ālayavijñāna of the Vijñānavādins may come into question. It is the substratum of transmigratory existence assumed by them and corresponds to the unchangeable substratum, that is, the ātman of the fourth stage whose existence is strongly asserted by the Shankara school. Shankara’s critique against this ālayavijñāna is found in his Brahmasūtra bhāṣya:
“In the Vijñānavāda doctrine, the so-called ālayavijñāna is by mistake considered to be the substratum of residual impressions and also being admittedly momentary, this ālayavijñāna is essentially something unstable, and similar to the active consciousness (pravr̥ttivijñāna); it can never be the substratum of residual impressions. This is because unless there exists one persistent entity which is equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable (eternal ātman) which cognizes everything, then we are unable to account for daily activities like memory and recognition which are subject to residual impressions dependent on place, time and cause. On the other hand, if you declare your ālayavijñāna to be by nature permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet (of the ālayavijñāna as well as everything else being momentary)”.
The Vijñānavādins recognize the ālayavijñāna as the substratum of residual impressions, but as they accept its momentariness, Shankara denies the possibility of its being the substratum. In Shankara’s view our daily activities like memory and recognition would presuppose the existence of a continuous entity (anvayin) that persists in all the three times, past, present and future, or else, an unchangeable, permanent (kūṭaśthanitya), quiescent ātman. Therefore, this ātman is essentially different from the ālayavijñāna.
Shankara’s ātman and the Vijñānavādin’s ālayavijñāna each arose from different backgrounds and long historical traditions. Even if they differ in essence, they show mutual similarity in their function that they exercise within each system, and as both of the two systems equally assert the non-reality of the phenomenal world, they both belong to a similar monistic standpoint.
In this context, it is quite interesting to note the following fact. Buddhist philosophers, Shāntarakṣita (725-788) and Kamalaśīla (740-796) point out that there is a “slight mistake” (alpāparādha) in the Advaita, in other words, the difference between their own and the Advaita standpoint, which lies in their understanding of the nature of vijñāna; seen from the side of Buddhism, the difference or the originality of each lies in the understanding of the nature of vijñāna and of ātman, pure consciousness. The Buddhist side criticizes the eternal nature of the ātman while the Vēdānta side attacks the momentariness of vijñāna. This is the last line on which neither side could by any means concede to the other from the theoretical point of view.
Then, how has the Vēdānta school, which is representative of the orthodox Brahminical (āstika) traditions, come to assume close similarities to Buddhism, which is representative of the non-orthodox (nāstika) traditions?
The Vēdāntinization of Buddhism did not start just at the time of Shāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. As is well known, in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which was probably composed around the year 400 A.D., tathāgatagarbha or the matrix-embryo of the tathāgata was not only at times identified with ālayavijñāna, but the definition of this tathāgatagarbha was also very similar to the definition of Brahman in the Vēdānta. Besides, Brahman, Viṣṇu, and īśvara are also used as synonyms of tathāgata and the highest Brahman comes to be regarded as the ultimate state. In the same sūtra, Mahāprajñā Bodhisattva raises the question to the Buddha as to whether the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha is not the same as the heretical ātman doctrine (tīrthakarātmavāda).
The question, of course, needs a further detailed investigation, but it seems to me that even though Buddhism had long been taking the doctrinal standpoint of denying the existence of ātman, Buddhism was gradually in the process of moving towards monism, negating pluralism of the Hīnayāna Buddhism, especially the Sarvāstivādins, and included such notions as tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna into the Buddhist doctrines; the inclusion of such notions reveals to us the weakening of Buddhism as a social force and the revival of Brahmanism and the consequent Brahmanization or Vēdāntinization of Buddhism. The tendency towards a monistic way of thinking is one great current that runs through the orthodox line of the history of Indian thought from the time of r̥gvēda.
On the other hand, the Vēdānta school was formed with the Brahmasūtra as its foundation in the fifth century, comparatively later than other philosophical schools including the Buddhist schools. The Vēdānta school established a system of Brahmanic monism based upon the Upaniṣads, and especially in reacting to the then rather influential Sāmkhya school.
However, this realistic monism of the Brahmasūtra was of a character of bhēdābhēda or dualistic monism, as it were. In denying such a standpoint and in the process of developing towards an absolute monism (Advaita), that is, the Upaniṣadic thought of the identity of Brahman and ātman, the realistic monism of the Brahmasūtra was gradually transformed and moved closer and closer to the Buddhism which had a more advanced theoretical system than the Vēdānta. While doing so, this Vēdānta philosophy came to be “Buddhisticized” considerably.
The gradual process of Buddhisticization of the Vēdānta school is reflected in the four chapters of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā of Gauḍapāda (640-690) in the seventh century. This Buddhisticization of the Vēdānta school reached its highest point in the fourth chapter of this work.
What Shankara, born in South India in the eighth century, found before him were: firstly the Mīmāmsā school which was very flourishing with excellent theoreticians like Kumārila (650-700), Prabhākara (700), Maṇḍanamiśra (680-720) and others; secondly, a big wave of popular Hinduism which penetrated in leaps and bounds through the masses, and thirdly, a weakening, esoteric-oriented Buddhism which was the target of strong criticisms of Kumārila and others; fourthly, a thoroughly Buddhisticized Vēdānta school.
Aiming at the revival of the Vēdānta school from the standpoint of orthodox Brahmanism, Shankara practically almost ignored popular Hinduism which stressed Bhakti, heaped severe criticism against the Mīmāmsā school which had no interest in the knowledge of the Brahman at all, breaking the formerly close relationship between the Mīmāmsā and the Vēdānta schools, and devoted himself to the knowledge of Brahman which is the most important topic of the Upaniṣads. On the other hand, vis-a-vis Buddhism, using his profound knowledge of Buddhism, he transmuted Buddhist doctrines in the Māṇḍūkyakārikā into Advaita; in other words, he re-injected the Upaniṣadic spirit into the extremely Buddhisticized Māṇḍūkyakārikā of his Paramaguru, pouring new life into it as it were, giving it an interpretation that followed the line of Vēdānta school and achieved the re-Vēdāntinization of the Buddhisticized Vēdāntic tradition.
In this way, Buddhist doctrines, which had been absorbed into the pre-Shankaran Vēdānta philosophy and constituted an integral part of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā, were preserved without being removed and were Vēdānticized by Shankara. As the result, the realistic monism of the Brahmasūtra was transformed and developed into an illusionistic non-dualism which, as he himself recognized, closely resembled the Buddhist doctrine.
From the above discussions, it may now be clear that Shankara is neither responsible for the Buddhisticization of the Vēdānta nor is a “Buddhist in disguise”. It might be Gauḍapāda the author of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā, or his predecessors, and not Shankara who can be called a ‘Buddhist in disguise’. For Shankara, Buddhism is an important target to overcome. For this reason, he attacks it very severely in his works. Shankara was an epoch-making reformer in the history of Vēdānta who turned the extremely Buddhisticized tradition of Vēdānta towards the Vēdāntic or Upaniṣadic Vēdānta.