– Excerpts from An Evaluation of the Vedāntic Critique of Buddhism by Gregory Joseph Darling
There is some evidence that the Gauḍapāda-kārikās, on which there is a commentary said to be written by śaṅkara, reveal strains of Buddhist influence, particularly from the Mādhyamika school. For instance, in verse 4 of the fourth chapter (prakaraṇa) there is an attempt to affirm the notion of the non-common origin (ajāti).
भूतं न जायते किञ्चिदभूतं नैव जायते |
विवदन्तोऽद्वया ह्येवमजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ते ||
“The existent is not born; whatever is non-existent is not born.
For, disputing thus the adherents of not-two (advaya) proclaim the non-common origin”.
According to Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya the first half of this kārikā is undoubtedly based on such a statement as Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā (I.6).
नैवासतो नैव सतः प्रत्ययोऽर्थस्य युज्यते |
असतः प्रत्ययः कस्य सतश्च प्रत्ययेन किम् ||
“Neither of an object-entity existing nor of an object-entity not existing is a condition applicable.
In connection with the non-existing, whose is the condition?
In connection with the existing, why by means of a condition?”
An interesting term used in the second half of the kārikā is ‘advaya’, those adhering to the notion of ‘not-two’. Bhattacharya explains that whereas the term Advaita signifies non-duality in the sense of non-difference, the term advaya signifies ‘not-two’ in the sense of avoidance of the two extremes (atyanta) and hence adherence to a middle path (madhyamā pratipad). The Buddha as Advayavādin (one of the titles for the Buddha) expounds the middle path as presented in such a verse as Nāgārjuna sets forth in the Madhyamaka vṛtti – a verse which teaches that there is neither origination nor cessation:
अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम् |
अनेकार्थमनानर्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ||
“(It is) without cessation, without birth, without destruction, not eternal, not having different meanings, not coming, not departing”.
The middle path is set forth in another kārikā, in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā, which states that those of inferior insight cannot comprehent the quiescence (upaśama).
अस्तित्वं ये तु पश्यन्ति नास्तित्वं चाल्पबुद्धयः |
भावनां ते न पश्यन्ति द्रष्टव्योपशमं शिवम् ||
“Those of slight intelligence who see only the existence and non-existence of entities do not see the apparent, benign quiescence”.
The notion of the middle path as avoidance of extremes is emphatically set forth in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (IV.22), where it is said that nothing can be produced or originated from itself or from another.
स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते |
सद् असत् सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते ||
“No given thing (vastu) whatsoever is born either from itself or from another.
No given thing whatsoever is born existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent”.
The first half of this kārikā seems to be taken from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā (XXI.13 and I.1)
न स्वतो जायते भावः परतो नैव जायते |
न स्वतः परतश्चैव जायते जायते कुतः ||
“Neither is an entity born from itself nor from another, nor is it born from both itself and another. Whence is it born?”
न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः |
उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन ||
“Nowhere at all are seen born any entities whatsoever, either from themselves, or from others, or from both themselves and others, or from no causes”.
The second half of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (IV.22) seems to be taken from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā (I.7).
न सन् नासन् न सदसन् धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा |
कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ||
“When no dharma either existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent evolves, how in that case is there applicable an evolver?”
A difficulty arises, however, in the occurrence of the term ‘ajāti’ (non-common origin). In Gauḍapāda-kārikā (IV.5), for instance, the term ‘ajāti’ is associated with approval of those who declare it.
ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैरनुमोदामहे वयम् |
विवदामो न तैः सार्धं अविवादं निबोधत ||
“We applaud the non-common origin being declared them; we do not contest; listen to our non-dispute with them”.
According to Bhattacharya, Gauḍapāda though a vedāntin, is here expressing approval of the Buddhist concept of non-origination (anutpāda).
It is to be noted here that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin, yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advayavādins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his vedāntin followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed.
It is to be questioned, however, whether the term ajāti signifies ‘non-origination’, or ‘non-common origination’. If it signifies ‘non-common origin’, then it does not possess Buddhistic connotations but is rather akin to the first type of name-and-formation, the unseparated name-and-formation (avyākṛta nāma-rūpa).
According to Hixon, the text of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā is composite in nature and is the result of a syncretistic Mahāyāna-Vedānta movement in the sixth-century Bengal – a syncretism inspired more by Mahāyāna than by Vedānta. In this respect, Hixon is expressing the position of Walleser, for whom there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa until the eighth century, a school which embodied the teachings of the Vedas and the upaniṣadas in the form of a collection of sayings. Bhattacharya thinks that the text requires an author and that as long as there is no contradiction or incongruity involved in the notion of a single author, one should accept the traditional view of an author named gauḍa. Bhattacharya, however, does hold the untraditional view that the four prakaraṇas of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās are four independent treatises put together under the title of āgamaśāstra. According to Hixon, the gauḍapāda-kārikās represent a synthesis of Mahāyāna and Vedānta with emphasis on the Mahāyāna aspect. According to Bhattacharya, the author Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin, whose Vijñānavāda tendencies are traceable to an Upaniṣadic source. Thus, according to Bhattacharya even the equation of the dream and waking states made in the Gauḍapāda-kārikās is traceable to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV.3.14), which contains the following passage:
‘Now indeed, they say that this (the state of sleep) is the state of waking, for those which he sees when he is awake he (sees) when he is asleep’.
According to Bhattacharya, the Upaniṣads are the seeds of the ‘idealism’ he finds in Buddhist Vijñānavāda and in the Gauḍapāda-kārikās or āgamaśāstra.
This Upaniṣadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before Gauḍapāda, has developed into what we now find in the āgamaśāstra.
According to Bhattacharya, there are two schools of Vijñānavāda: a school of Vedāntins headed by Gauḍapāda, and a school of Buddhists with Maitreya at the head. The difference between the two, according to Bhattacharya, consists in that Vedānta Vijñānavāda emphasizes ātman and the concept of Māyā, whereas Buddhist Vijñānavāda denies ātman, and emphasizes thought (citta) and the concept of habit-energy (vāsanā ). Ultimately however, according to Bhattacharya, the Brahman of Vedānta and the thought (citta) of Vijñānavāda are identical except that whereas the former is nitya (eternal), the latter is dhruva (enduring). The word ‘nitya’, Bhattacharya notes, does not allow for change, whereas the word ‘dhruva’ does allow for change. According to Wayman, the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Gauḍapāda-kārikās were composed concurrently by members of the Gauḍa school during the early Gupta dynasty (fifth century A.D.), and the members of the Gauḍa school may have been Vedāntins who studied at one of the large Buddhist universities in northern India such as Nālanda.
Although Bhattacharya inclined towards the view that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin and that the āgamaśāstra drew its primary inspiration from the Upaniṣads, in particular, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, he nevertheless was aware of the traces of Buddhist influence throughout the work, particularly in the fourth prakaraṇa. Throughout the work, concepts, terms and occasionally phrases seem to be drawn from Buddhist scriptures in what seems to be an attempt to syncretize Mahayāna Buddhism and Vedānta.
Coming to śaṅkara, it is possible that his knowledge of Buddhism was obtained from the school or tradition named Gauḍapāda, as well as from the Mīmāmsā teacher Kumārila, who had earlier attacked the Buddhists in his śloka vārtika. There is a tradition that the paramaguru of śaṅkara was a figure named Gauḍapāda. Towards the end of the commentary on the Gauḍapāda-kārikā, the commentator salutes his paramaguru.
प्रज्ञावैशाखवेधक्षुभितजलनिधेर्वेदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थं
भूतान्यालोक्य मग्नान्यविरतजननग्राहघोरे समुद्रे |
कारुण्यादुद्दधाराममृतमिदमरैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतोः
यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुममुं पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि ||
Whether or not śaṅkara wrote the commentary to the Gauḍapāda-kārikā, there are references to the Gauḍapāda-kārikās in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya of śaṅkara. As T M P Mahadevan notes, in his commentary to the Brahmasūtra II.1.9, śaṅkara cites a verse from the Gauḍapāda-kārikā.
अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते |
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ||
‘When a Jīva asleep by means of beginningless Māyā is awakened, he is awakened to the Unborn, Sleepless, Dreamless, Non-dual’.
The point śaṅkara is urging in his commentary to the Brahmasūtra II.1.9 is that the Self remains unaffected by the states of creation, subsistence, destruction; consequently, the Brahman is not affected by the world at the time of pralaya. śaṅkara by introducing the verse from the Gauḍapāda-kārikā is equating the macroscopic states of waking, dream, and sleep, none of which affect the Turīyā. Furthermore, in his commentary to the Brahmasūtras I.4.14, śaṅkara referring to those who know the tradition cites another verse from the Gauḍapāda-kārikās.
‘So also, those knowing the tradition say: By the characteristic of earth, iron, sparks, etc. the creation which is otherwise enjoined, is the means for the realization – there is no difference in any way whatsoever’.
śaṅkara in his commentary to this sūtra is noting that although there are discrepancies in scriptural passages concerning the order of things created, nevertheless they all indicate the Brahman, from which comes the origin, subsistence, and destruction of the world.
The purpose of the creation-texts, according to śaṅkara, is not to teach the process of creation, but to teach the Brahman, as is indicated for śaṅkara by a passage in Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI.8.4). The Gauḍapāda-kārikā passage exemplifies what for śaṅkara is the ultimate truth – that there is no difference (bheda) between creator and creation.
Many theories have been adopted to explain śaṅkara’s connection with Gauḍapāda or with the Gauḍapāda school. According to Hacker, as Alston notes, śaṅkara began as an expositor of the Yoga system but later found the spiritual discipline of Advaita more effective. According to Ingalls, śaṅkara was brought up in the tradition of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) and was later influenced by the school represented in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā.
‘It seems to me likely that śaṅkara was brought up in the Bhedābheda tradition and that he later turned away from it under the influence of a much more phenomenalistic school that is now represented only by the Gauḍapāda-kārikās. But śaṅkara never went so far in the direction of phenomenalism as Gauḍapāda’.
Whaling explains, however, that śaṅkara’s opposition to Bhedābheda in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya is no proof that he had earlier been a follower of Bhedābheda. According to Whaling, it seems more probable that śaṅkara began as a close follower of Gauḍapāda and then began to react against him. According to Hixon, śaṅkara’s teachings reveal a synthesis of Mīmāmsā and Gauḍa teachings so that śaṅkara must have undergone early training under conservative Mīmāmsā influences and was later expose to the Gauḍa school.
‘But from the point of view of his philosophical attitudes, it is difficult to see how śaṅkara could have developed such an intense involvement with the conservative, text-oriented approach to Vedānta unless this reflected training and conditioning from a young age. Be this as it may, however, it is undeniable that śaṅkara represents a strangely precarious balance between the Mīmāmsā conservativism and Gauḍa radicalism’.
According to Hixon, the writing style of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya of śaṅkara has a strong flavor of the Mīmāmsā school in its concern for interpreting passages so that they appear to have a single purport and in his use of hermeneutical techniques. But in this text, Hixon notes, śaṅkara also employs the Gauḍa approach, inherited from Mahāyāna, of ‘two texts, two truths’.
In order to assess the possible relationship of śaṅkara with the teacher Gauḍapāda or school by that name, it is necessary to approach the question of śaṅkara’s historical relationship to the school or person that was Gauḍapāda. One of the chief objections to the theory of śaṅkara’s authorship of the commentary to the Māṇḍūkya kārikā is the fact that the author of the commentary to the Gauḍapāda-kārikās seems to approve of the subjective idealism of the kārikās by which the dream and waking states are equated. Such approval contradicts śaṅkara’s position position in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, where śaṅkara refutes what he considers to be the Vijñānavāda position that dream and waking states are equivalent. According to the Gauḍapāda-kārikāS, the waking and dream states are equivalent in that each state involves the dichotomy of subject and object.
यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः |
तथा जाग्रद् द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ||
‘As the mind in dream vibrates having a two-fold appearance, so in the waking state, the mind having a two-fold appearance vibrates through Māyā’.
According to the commentator, the dream and waking states are equivalent in that each involves the dichotomy of subject and object.
कथं पुनः सतो माययैव जन्मेत्युच्यते – यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पतः सर्पो रज्जुरूपेणावेक्ष्यमाणः सन् एवं मनः परमात्मविज्ञप्त्यात्मरूपेण अवेक्ष्यामाणं सत् ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपेण द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते स्वप्ने मायया रज्ज्वामिव सर्पः | तथा तद्वदेव जाग्रत् जागरिते स्पन्दते मायया मनः स्पन्दत इवेत्यर्थः ||
‘How again is it said that there is the birth of an existing thing through Māyā? As a snake imagined in a rope is existent, while addressed under the form of a rope, so the mind is addressed as existent under the formation of the self and the representation (vijñapti) of the highest self and has a two-fold appearance of subject and object. It vibrates in the dream through a magical display ( Māyā ) – like the snake in the rope. So, in this manner, ‘awake’ in the waking state, the mind vibrates through magical display; it ‘vibrates’, signifies ‘as though it vibrates’.
The commentator’s approval here of the equation of dream and waking states is in marked contrast to the position taken by śaṅkara in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, where the dream and waking states are declared to be quiet distinct. śaṅkara in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya stresses the empirical reality of perception in the waking state.
अत्रोच्यते – न स्वप्नादि प्रत्ययवत् जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति; कस्मात् वैधर्म्यात् – वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः; किं पुनर्वैधर्म्यं बाधाबाधविति ब्रूमः बाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु प्रतिबुद्धस्य |
‘It is said – like the notions of dreams etc., the notions of the waking state are not able to be. Why? Because of diversity. There is diversity in connection with the dream-state and the waking-state. Why is there diversity? We say – because of supplanting and non-supplanting – for a given thing perceived in a dream is supplanted for the waking state’.
śaṅkara in his commentary even employs the term ‘bādhyate’ to emphasize that the things apprehended as real in the dream-state are supplanted in the waking-state. His position here seems in marked contrast to the position taken by the commentator on the Gauḍapāda-kārikās. According to Ingalls, śaṅkara’s position in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya has made him liable to the charge of hypocrisy by ancient and modern critics, who are dubious about śaṅkara’s inconsistency.
‘Let me consider Bhāskara’s charge of hypocrisy against śaṅkara. The same charge has been brought forward by a few scholars in modern times too. It may be put most strongly as follows. In arguing against the Vijñānavāda, śaṅkara seems to argue as a realist. Certainly, he seems to insist on the reality of the external thing. On the other hand, when developing his own system of philosophy, he claims not once but a hundred times that the world is unreal, as unreal as the foam on water, as the trick of a magician, as a mirage, as a dream. If not hypocrisy, this is at least a logical contradiction’.
The ancient commentator Bhāskara, for instance, as Ingalls observes, excoriates śaṅkara in his own commentary to this sūtra for being one of the ‘Māyāvādins hanging on to Buddhist doctrine’ (ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनस्ते ). It should be noted however, that the seeming contradictoriness of the positions taken by śaṅkara in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya and the commentator on the Gauḍapāda-kārikās, may not indicate philosophical inconsistency. Mahadevan notes that the subjective idealism of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās may simply be a device.
‘The procedure followed by Gauḍapāda, then, is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists in the West in their criticism of the Realistic doctrines. Subjectivist arguments are advanced only to overthrow Realism. And when this is accomplished, Subjectivism itself is subjected to unsparing criticism; and is finally discarded’.
Mahadevan’s argument can be extended to the case of the commentary on the Gauḍapāda-kārikās; there is no need to regard the equation of dream and waking states in the commentary to the kārikās, or to accuse him of hypocrisy if he were the traditional commentator. Mahadevan cites B. Bosanquet in the value of subjective idealism as a methodological or procedural device to produce dissatisfaction with the world blindly accepted by common sense.
According to Alston, modern research, utilizing the methods of Professor Hacker, has removed all reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of śaṅkara’s authorship of the commentary to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda-kārikās.
In his article, ‘On the Author of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad – and the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya’, Mayeda tests the authenticity of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā Bhāṣya by comparing it with the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya in connection with the use of eight terms – avidyā, nāmarūpa, māyā, īśvara, ānanda, vivarta, śiva and vyāsa. According to Mayeda, śaṅkara’s stylistic and conceptual peculiarities are so manifest in his use of these particular terms that his works can be distinguished by this method even from the works of his disciples. Mayeda concludes that a result of his comparison, the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya is in complete agreement with the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya in connection with the usage of these eight terms. Therefore, according to Mayeda, śaṅkara must be the author of Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya. Mayeda also mentions four points raised by those who question the authenticity of śaṅkara’s authorship of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya:
1. Whereas in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, śaṅkara demonstrates knowledge of Buddhism, the author of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya seems ignorant of Buddhism.
2. The author of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya uses Buddhist technical terms used neither in the kārikās nor in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (for example, the highest ātman is called vijñapti).
3. There are several cases of interpretation which do not look like śaṅkara’s (e.g., the author of Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya asserts that Asparśayoga is well-known in the Upaniṣads although it is never mentioned in the Upaniṣads)
4. The Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya begins and ends with benedictory stanzas, although benedictory stanzas are seen in comparatively modern works.
To Mayeda, the first three objections are closely related in that they have to do with the philosophical standpoint of the author of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya, and his consequent principle of interpretation. That philosophical standpoint, according to Mayeda, and that principle of interpretation, represent ‘Advaitization’. The purpose of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās for the commentator, according to Mayeda, is to reveal the knowledge of Brahman and so the author interprets it consistently from the Advaitin point of view. Mayeda says of the author of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya:
‘According to him the objective of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā is the realization of the state of non-duality (advaitabhāva), i.e., the realization of the natural state of ātman ( svasthatā ) and the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā was meant to reveal the knowledge of Brahman. In other words, the author intends to interpret it consistently from the Advaita point of view’.
Mayeda goes on to note that the effect of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya was to give the kārikās an Advaitic character and that the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya represents a turning point in the Vedānta tradition, which until the time of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya had been becoming more Buddhistic. Mayeda seems to assume, however, that each chapter of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās is more Buddhistic in character than the preceding chapter, that each was written after the preceding, that the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad was written prior to the Gauḍapāda-kārikās, and that there was not one author who composed or compiled the text of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās, when he speaks of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya as a turning point in a Vedānta tradition becoming progressively more Buddhistic. Furthermore, Mayeda’s statement ignores the tradition of the Brahmasūtra and its commentators – a tradition which attempts to refute what it considers to be Buddhist doctrines. Mayeda’s point, however, is that the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya represents an attempt to reinterpret the Buddhistic tendencies of the Gauḍa tradition along Advaita lines, whereas in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, śaṅkara tries to interpret a Bhedābheda text along Advaita lines.
The process of ‘Advaitization’ of the Gauḍapāda kārikās, as well as of other scriptures, according to Mayeda, is responsible for śaṅkara’s seeming ignorance of Buddhism, his idiosyncratic use and interpretation of Buddhist terms and Upaniṣadic passages. According to Mayeda, śaṅkara had a profound knowledge of Buddhism. What lies behind the commentator’s interpretation of a word like ‘dharma’, in Gauḍapāda kārikā IV.99, in one case as ‘ātman’ and in another case as ‘viṣayāntara’ is not ignorance, but intentional misinterpretation. In his commentary to Gauḍapāda kārikā IV.99, the commentator seems to be aware of the meaning of the terms ‘dharma’ and ‘buddha’ in the Buddhist context, but interprets them in terms of his own purposes.
क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः |
सर्वधर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ||
Interpreting this passage in terms of the ‘silence’ of the Buddha, Bhattacharya translates it as follows:
‘According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him, jñāna does not approach the dharmas (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects). But all dharmas as well as jñāna – this has not been said by the Buddha’.
This passage, however, may also be interpreted in terms of the Buddha as the protector. Thus another possible translation proceeds as follows:
‘The knowledge (jñāna) of the protector (tāyin) Buddha does not extend to the dharmas.
Likewise, all dharmas (do not extend to) knowledge – this was not spoken by the Buddha’.
Swami Gambhirananda’s translation, which reflects the traditional commentary, proceeds as follows:
‘The knowledge of the enlightened man, who is all-pervasive, does not extend to objects; and so the souls, too, do not reach out to objects. This view was not expressed by Buddha’.
The shifting interpretation of the terms ‘dharma’ and ‘tāyin’ in the traditional commentary should be noted.
‘For, from that, there is the knowledge situated in dharma like the light of the sun. In connection with the awakened one (buddha) seeing the absolute, (this knowledge) does not extend to dharmas or distinct sense-objects’.
In the phrase ‘of the protector (tāyin)’, ‘tāyin’ is in reference to the pervading (tāya) by him; the meaning is that it is like the continuous succession without interval that is similar to space. Or the phrase ‘of the protector’ is in connection with the one endowed with either honor or insight. The significance is that the dharmas or Selves (ātman), likewise, like knowledge, do not extend to distinct object-entities anywhere, because of similarity to space.
Of the commentator’s treatment of the term Dharma, Mayeda says that what is involved here is an intentional misinterpretation, not ignorance.
‘The term dharma in the Gauḍapādīya kārikā IV.99 is no doubt used in a Buddhist sense, i.e., ‘a thing’ or ‘an object of knowledge’. However, the commentator explains it as ātman. He sometimes does not interpret it. This fact probably does not indicate ignorance of the Buddhist usage of the term, but rather an intentional misinterpretation by the author so as to give the text an Advaitic character’.
That śaṅkara was quite aware of the Buddhist sense of the term dharma is according to Mayeda attested by a verse in the Upadeśasāhasrī where he uses the term in a Buddhistic sense to refute a Buddhist tenet.
क्षणिकं हि तदत्यर्थं धर्ममात्रं निरन्तरम् |
सादृश्याद्दीपवत् तद्धीस्तच्छान्तिः पुरुषार्थता ||
‘(All) this is indeed the mere dharma (element of life) which indeed perishes every moment and arises without intervals. (Though all this is momentary), there arises the recognition that this is that past one, because of similarity, just as a lamp at this moment is recognized to be the same as it was at the previous moment on account of similarity. The cessation of (all) this is the aim of life’.
The more accurate treatment of the term dharma, in comparison with its treatment in the commentary to Gauḍapāda kārikā IV.99 should be noted. The reasonably accurate presentation of the Buddhist explanation of memory in terms of similarity should also be noted. Mayeda also indicates, however, the difference between śaṅkara’s approach to Buddhism in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, and the approach of the author of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya. In the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, the process of ‘Advaitization’ is directed towards the Bhedābheda of the Brahmasūtras and its tradition of commentary; the approach towards Buddhism is one of refutation only. Consequently, śaṅkara’s commentary, in comparison with those of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja, is far removed from the original significance of the Brahmasūtras. But in the Gauḍapādīya Bhaśya, the process of ‘Advaitization’ is directed towards the Buddhist doctrines of the Gauḍa tradition. In this way, Mayeda demonstrates the authenticity of śaṅkara’s authorship of the Gauḍapādīya Bhāṣya and illumines śaṅkara’s intention towards the work of interpretation – to interpret the texts in an Advaitic way.
It must be recalled that śaṅkara has been regarded by his opponents as a ‘crypto’ Buddhist. Bhāskara, a later Vedāntic commentator, for instance, refers to ‘the Māyāvādins hanging on to Buddhist doctrine’.
Bhāskara goes on to excoriate śaṅkara for attempting to refute śūnyavāda through the argument that the world cannot be denied except on the basis of the discovery of another truth. Bhāskara accuses śaṅkara of slyly denying the world on the basis of ātman.
– Now you think, ‘When there is no other permanent thing, no other given thing, consciousness-only (Vijñānamātra) is rejected, but when there is the truth of the self there is the dissolution of the manifold world’.
Ingalls interprets this passage as follows: ‘Perhaps you reason thus’, he says, ‘So long as there is no other permanent entity, pure consciousness is to be denied. But when there is the true ātman, then we can get rid of the world’. Bhāskara goes on to ask, ‘What sort of logic is this?’
According to Ingalls, however, śaṅkara’s emphasis in his commentary to Brahmasūtra II.2.29 is on the necessity of something beyond cognition, namely a cognizer.
‘Notice, first, that in arguing with the Buddhist idealists śaṅkara’s emphasis is not so much on the necessity of something beyond cognition’.
An interesting contribution to the study of śaṅkara’s crypto-Buddhism and śaṅkara’s relationship to previous commentators on the Brahmasūtras has been made by Daniel Ingalls in his articles ‘Shankara’s Arguments Against the Buddhists’ (Philosophy East and West, Volume III, Number 4) and ‘The Study of Shankaracharya’ (Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Volume XXXIII). In these articles he concedes that the earliest extant commentary to the Brahmasūtras in the Brahmasūtra Bhāśya of śaṅkara, written probably early in the eighth century A.D., and that the next earliest commentary is that of Bhāskara, written around 800 A.D. But he also concludes, on the basis of certain evidence, that there must have been an earlier commentary which served as the basis for śaṅkara’s and Bhāskara’s later works. The author of this earlier commentary Ingalls simply calls the ‘Proto-commentator’. One basis, according to Ingalls, for assuming the existence of a proto-commentary is the fact that Bhāskara, śaṅkara and commentators of śaṅkara’s commentary refer to a figure called the vṛttikāra – the commentator. In his commentary to Brahmasūtra I.1.9, I.1.23, I.2.23 and III.3.53, śaṅkara mentions the vṛttikāra. Ingalls males the very interesting observation that wherever the super-commentators of śaṅkara’s works indicate that śaṅkara is departing from the proto-commentary, it is to be noted that Bhāskara upholds the views of the proto-commentator and passionately objects to śaṅkara’s departure. Ingalls thinks that Bhāskara’s commentary is based largely on the proto-commentary. Ingalls also points out that a large part of Bhāskara’s commentary is basically similar to śaṅkara’s. Since Bhāskara had little love for śaṅkara, whom he attacks often in vitriolic fashion, it cannot be said that Bhāskara was borrowing from śaṅkara. Rather, it seems better to assume, Ingalls explains, the existence of a common proto-commentary which served as the basis for the work of śaṅkara and Bhāskara. One instance, according to Ingalls, where the super-commentators mention that śaṅkara is departing from the views of the vṛttikāra, occurs at brahmasūtra I.1.19. The sūtra proceeds as follows:
अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति |
‘And, moreover, it (i.e. the scripture) teaches the joining of this with that on that (being fully known)’.
In his commentary to this sūtra, śaṅkara first presents the view which Govardhana and ānandagiri attribute to the vṛttikāra or proto-commentator. According to this view, ānandamayātman (self consisting in bliss) is identified with the Paramātman (Highest Self), in that otherwise liberation (Mokṣa) is not possible. Brahman in itself, śaṅkara explains, cannot be described as ‘abounding in bliss’. For śaṅkara, the term ānandamaya is no more a description of Brahman than the other members of the series beginning with annamaya. The affix ‘-maya’, according to śaṅkara, denotes modification just as in the case of the other members of the series.
It seems, therefore, that śaṅkara is relegating the ānandamaya to the sphere of empirical or relative (vyavahāra) truth, thereby declaring in opposition to the view attributed by Govardhana and ānandagiri to the vṛttikāra, that the ānandamayātman and the Paramātman are not equivalent in the sense that ānanda can be considered to be of the nature of the Brahman. Bhāskara, however, as Ingalls notes, accepts the interpretation of the vṛttikāra or Proto-commentator and criticizes śaṅkara’s interpretation, and says, ‘The proper way to interpret this sūtra is the traditionally handed down way’. Although śaṅkara departs from the traditional interpretation of the vṛttikāra, however, one must not be too quick to dismiss his interpretations as parenthetical remarks. Other passages in which śaṅkara departs from the traditional commentary of the vṛttikāra to the refrain of vitriolic criticism on Bhāskara’s part are listed as follows: Brahmasūtra I.1.23, I.2.23, I.4.26. There has been much speculation in relation to the identity of the vṛttikāra in śaṅkara’s Brahmsūtra Bhāṣya. S Das Gupta mentions an article by Prof. S. Kuppusvami Sastri in which he quotes a passage from Veṅkaṭa’s Tattvaṭīkā on Rāmānuja’s commentary on the Brahmasūtras, in which it is said that Upavarṣa is a name of Bodhāyana:
वृत्तिकारस्य बोधायनस्य हि उपवर्ष इति स्यान् नाम |
S Das Gupta goes on to explain that the commentaries on śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtra Bhāśya say that, when he refers to the vṛtitkāra or proto-commentator in Brahmasūtra I.1.19, I.1.23, I.2.23 and III.5.3, he refers to Upavarṣa by name. In only one of these passages, however, does śaṅkara refer to Upavarṣa by name, that is to say, in his commentary to Brahmasūtra III.3.53.
Rāmānuja also attacks the Vedāntinas of śaṅkara’s school. In his attempt to refute Vijñānavādins, Rāmānuja also attacks those Vedāntins (presumably of śaṅkara’s school) whom he calls ‘crypto’ Buddhists (pracchanna-bauddha) for their supposed position that the absolute (paramārtha) is mere knowledge (jñānamātra) – a position formulated according to Rāmānuja on the basis of knowledge in a form having both action (karma) and agent ( kartṛ ), a subject and an object.
A concept which the Gauḍapāda-kārikās have in common with Buddhism and which is taken up by śaṅkara is that of ‘two truths’ – the absolute truth (paramārtha satya) and conventional truth (saṃvṛti satya). It is to be noted that the Upaniṣads also speak of a higher science [parāvidyā] and a lower science [aparā vidyā]. Associated with the distinction of types of truth is the distinction of spiritual states (āśrama). Truth is thereby made provisional in accordance with the needs of the seeker.
आश्रमास्त्रिविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्टयः |
उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया ||
There are three types of stages – the lower vision, the middle, and the superior vision; therefore the meditative exercise is to be taught out of compassion.
The treatment of upāsanā here may be the precedent for śaṅkara’s treatment of upāsanā as it is described by V Raghavan in his Introduction to the ‘Thirty Two Vidya-s’.
śaṅkara says that such is man’s habitual preoccupation with action that it is difficult to get away from it and hence the upāsanā-s of meditations on aspects of these acts in a higher significance, to be mentally dwelt upon, form one way of slowly abstracting oneself from them.
In Gauḍapāda-kārikā IV.58, the ‘two truths’ are presented through the term “saṃvṛti” and the term ‘tattva’. In this verse, it is said that dharmas, which are said to be born, are born only from the standpoint of conventional truth (saṃvṛti), not in reality (tattva).
धर्मा य इति जायन्ते संवृत्या ते न तत्त्वतः |
जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ||
In the second half of this verse, there appears the term ‘māyā’ which is employed in a variety of meanings in the Indian context and which here signifies ‘magical display’. The birth of dharmas is declared to be ‘like magical display’. The term ‘māyā’ as signifying magical display is employed in other kārikās of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā, such as kārikā 59 of fourth prakaraṇa.
यथा मायामयाद् बीजाज्जायते तन्मयोऽङ्कुरः |
नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्धर्मेषु योजना ||
From a seed constituted of a magical display is born a sprout constituted of the same; that is neither eternal nor attended with destruction. In this way, there is the application to dharmas.
The use of the term māyā in the sense of magical display has precedent in Buddhist literature, as for example the following sentence in Catuḥśataka from which the kārikā cited above seems to have been drawn:
यथा हि कृतकाद् बीजाज्जायते तन्मयोऽङ्कुरः |
In Gauḍapāda-kārikā IV.73, the terms ‘parikalpita’ (imagined) and ‘paratantra’ (dependent) are associated with each other and declared to exist from the standpoint of empirical truth only, not absolute truth.
योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ |
परतन्त्रोऽभिसंवृत्या स्यान्नास्ति परमार्थतः ||
That which exists by convention, which is fabricated, does not exist by means of the absolute.
The dependent (paratantra) may exist only by means of convention; it does not exist in reality.
In this kārikā, the characteristic of being imagined (kalpita) seems to be equated with the characteristic of being dependent (paratantra), in that they possess the common quality of existing by means of the convention (abhisaṃvṛti), not by means of the absolute (paramārtha). The relationship among these three terms is explained by Bhattacharya on the basis of Prajñākaramati’s statement in the Bodhicaryāvatāra pañjikā:
It is to be noted that saṃvṛti consists in parikalpita and paratantra svabhāvas and paramārtha in pariniṣpanna. This it is rightly said in the kārikā 73 that paratantra can exist only in practical truth (saṃvṛti) and not in anyway in absolute truth. This is fully explained by Prajñākaramati in his Bodhicaryāvatāra pañjikā saying that whatever comes into existence does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions [hetupratyayasāmagrī], and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass.
The point here is that whatever arises dependent on causes and conditions is like a magical display. Prajñākaramati in the Bodhicaryāvatāra pañjikā explains as follows:
अपि तु हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्रीं प्रतीत्य मायावदुत्पाद्यते |